

THE NEW REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

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Serowe, one of Botswana's principal towns, in a green year before the drought

THE FIRST of Britain's former High Commission Territories to achieve statehood, the Bechuanaland Protectorate joined the ranks of Africa's independent states as the Republic of Botswana on September 30. The birth of the new republic could hardly come at a more unfortunate time in terms of Britain's ability and willingness to provide long-term financial assistance. And without such assurances of massive economic support, the ability of meagerly-endowed, drought-stricken Botswana to avoid slipping into a *de facto* Bantustan relationship with South Africa is handicapped. The will is clearly there, however, and a way may yet be found.

With a population of 560,000 and an annual estimated growth rate of 3.5 percent, Botswana is threatened with a 100 percent population increase by 1985. Although the new republic is Texas-sized—an estimated 220,000 square miles—most of the west and southwest consists of the Kalahari Desert, and there are virtually no surface waters to sustain year-round habitation except in the north and along the railroad line in the east. In these circumstances, 90 percent of the population derives a livelihood of sorts from the raising of cattle (mostly for the South African market), and some 30,000 Batswana who are currently employed in the Republic of South Africa or Rho-

desia have little prospect of finding comparable local jobs in the near future. Indeed, the influx into South Africa could increase if economic development does not keep pace with the population increase.

The Decline and Rise of Seretse Khama

Perhaps Botswana's most valuable asset at independence is its good sense in entrusting governmental leadership to a President as competent and resourceful as Seretse Khama. A grandson of Khama III, the most illustrious chief of the Bamangwato, Seretse Khama was studying law at Oxford in 1945 when he met and subsequently married an

English girl. Although he returned home with his bride and gradually made his peace with his people, he was suddenly banished from Bechuanaland by the British Government in 1950 and denied the chieftaincy to which he was heir; many believe that South African pressure was responsible.

When the Bamangwato repeatedly refused to elect another chief, Seretse Khama was at last permitted to return to Bechuanaland with his wife and children in 1956, if he would renounce the chieftaincy for himself and his heirs. No restrictions were placed on his other activities, however, and he began to move

toward the center of Protectorate politics in 1959; his Bechuanaland Democratic Party, organized in March 1962, scored a landslide victory in the general elections of March 1965.

There are 31 elected seats in Botswana's National Assembly, and 28 of these are occupied by members of Khama's governing party. Of the opposition parties, the only one to win any parliamentary representation (three seats) in the 1965 elections was the pan-Africanist Bechuanaland People's Party, led by Philip G. Matante. All candidates of Motsamai Mpho's Bechuanaland Independence Party and a second Bechuanaland People's Party led by veteran nationalist K.T. Motsete were defeated. The BPP charged that its poor showing was due to widespread corruption at the polls, but there is every evidence that the majority party's support from the electorate was genuine and overwhelming. Considering that this was the first modern-style election ever held in the vast Protectorate, the turnout of some 140,789 voters—75 percent of the electorate—was impressive.

The Unsatisfied Chiefs

Although Khama's opposition was too fragmented to pose a serious threat in 1965, the possibility of an operational alliance between foes on his right and on his left—chiefs suddenly fearful of the threat to traditional ways posed by a strong central government, and the frustrated pan-Africanist opposition parties—had already begun to emerge. In fact, the BPP probably would not have won its three seats in the Francistown and Mochudi districts in 1965 without the support of Chief Linchwe of the Bakgatla.

The Batswana, or Bechuana, comprise the majority of the African population, but the eight sections of the tribe are independent of each other and there is no paramount chief. Under British rule, all land in Bechuanaland has been either tribal territory, crown land, railway reserve, or designated European settlement area. The tribal reserves cover a total land area of 109,395 square miles, varying in size from the 70 square mile plot of the Batlokwa to the 44,941 miles of the Bamangwato.

The republican constitution reflects Seretse Khama's view that strong central executive powers are required to build a nation out of these diverse and widely scattered peoples (as well as the small but powerful European community), to initiate the kind of development projects Botswana requires for growth, and to maintain a steady foreign policy course in rough seas. It provides for a President with full executive powers, to be elected

by a unicameral National Assembly every five years; if the President fails to retain majority support of the legislative body, however, he must dissolve it and call for new elections before its term has expired. The first National Assembly, automatically composed of the members of the former Legislative Assembly elected in 1965, will end its term on March 23, 1970 unless dissolved prior to that date. Transitional provisions were made for the Prime Minister to become President on independence day, and for the Deputy Prime Minister to become Vice-President.

The constitution also provides for a separate House of Chiefs in which tribal authorities will have the right to debate bills and motions relating to certain chieftaincy matters. Although tribal authorities joined the consensus in support of the constitutional proposals when these were first drawn up at a remarkably peaceful roundtable in Lobatsi in November 1963, they later began to have second thoughts. Two chiefs, the senior Chief Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse, for 27 years chairman of the African Council, and young, British-educated Chief Linchwe of the Bakgatla declined nomination for Chairman of the House. Chief Bathoen observed that he would not stoop to serve as Chairman of a House which had no future, and which neither the Queen's Commissioner nor the government regarded seriously. These chiefly grievances, given behind-the-scenes encouragement by disgruntled modernist political leaders ready to exploit any opportunity to embarrass the Khama government, culminated in a vote of no-confidence in the existence and functions of the House of Chiefs in November 1965. Instead, the chiefs demanded the establishment of a true bicameral legislature in which a House of Chiefs would exercise genuine authority. Chief Bathoen, pressing these demands, charged that the independence constitution would strip the chiefs of all responsibilities except for the mechanics of local government administration, and warned that "a people who rely on their chiefs as heavily as the Bechuana can turn out a government that silences this traditionalism." At the final constitutional conference in London in February 1966, the BPP's Matante, representing opposition groups, reversed his party's earlier position on such matters to cite the liquidation of the powers of the chiefs as one of the reasons for his protest walk-out prior to the signature of the agreement.

Despite the solid phalanx of chiefly support behind Chief Bathoen, the government held firm and declined to undertake to amend the constitution along the lines demanded. Noting the sweeping majority given the government party at

BASIC FACTS

Population:

543,105 (1964 census), including 3,921 Europeans, 3,489 Euraficans, and 382 Asians. The eight major Batswana tribes holding tenure over Tribal Territories are: the Bakgatla (32,118), Bakwena (73,088), Bangwaketse (71,289), Bamaletse (13,861), Bamangwato (199,782), Barolong (10,662), Batawana (42,347), and Batlokwa (3,711).

Area:

220,000 square miles.

Main business centers:

Gaborone (capital, population 5,000); Lobatsi (7,604), Francistown (9,479).

Transport:

394 miles of the Cape Town to Rhodesia line lie within Bechuanaland; the railway was formerly operated by Rhodesia Railways to the north and South African Railways to the south of Mahalapye, but Rhodesia Railways assumed responsibility for the entire Botswana segment effective September 26, 1966. Airports are located at Francistown and Shakawe, and landing fields at 16 other points. There are 13 miles of tarred and 5,011 miles of gravelled or earth roads, with some additional construction; a new 318 mile road under construction between Francistown and Maun is being financed by a 1964 International Development Association loan.

Currency

The South African Rand (R1.00 = \$1.40).

Budget

Estimated revenue for 1966/67 is R10,374,456; expenditures are expected to total R10,374,456. These figures relate only to ordinary revenue and expenditures, excluding contributions from United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Fund but including grant-in-aid from the UK Treasury (R4,250,000 in 1966/67). Under a long-standing customs union with the Republic of South Africa, Bechuanaland receives another important segment of its revenue—0.27622 percent of the total customs revenue collected by the Republic. British Colonial Development and Welfare funds granted to Bechuanaland between 1955 and 1965 totalled R8,267,100. A further R5,200,000 has been granted for the period April 1, 1965 to March 31, 1967.

—From the May 1966 issue of *Kutlwane*, a publication of the Information Branch of the Bechuanaland Government.

the polls, deputy Prime Minister (now Vice President) Quett Masire observed that "while the chiefs may tell their people who to vote for, they can't go with them to the polling booths." Government spokesmen warned the chiefs that they would be "digging their own graves" if they let themselves be used by "the Communist Party" to threaten the stability of the government.


New Leadership on the Left

These references to "Communist influence" and "Communist collaboration" are obviously directed toward Dr. Kenneth Koma, a newcomer to the political scene. Educated at Cape Town University, Nottingham in Britain, and Charles University in Prague, and more recently the recipient of a doctor of philosophy degree from the University of Moscow, he returned to Bechuanaland shortly before the March 1965 election. Dr. Koma, who incidentally disclaims any Communist affiliation, has worked quietly and effectively to bring together various disaffected elements. By June 1965, he had succeeded in opening discussions between such diverse political figures as the leaders of the defeated BIP and Motsete's BPP, Chief Linchwe, and S. Gaseitsiwe, son of Chief Bathoen and chief-designate of the Bangwaketse. Workers and civil servants resentful of the government's continued reliance upon expatriates and its cautious handling of obvious racism in white-dominated urban centers were also attracted to Dr. Koma's call to action. A National Front was launched at Mochudi, Chief Linchwe's village, in October 1965 with two proclaimed aims: "to unite the different communities in Bechuanaland on the basis of full equality . . . and mobilize the masses, making them an integral part of the national liberatory movement in Africa."

In the government's first test at the polls since the formation of the National Front, however, Khama's BDP came through with another resounding vote of confidence that helped to calm nerves in official quarters. In the June 13, 1966 local elections, the BDP took 136 out of 165 seats. The BPP and BIP won 21 and five seats respectively, and independents three. The extent of the victory can probably be credited in part to Khama's prudent decision following the London conference to hold out a peace offering to the chiefs: The House of Chiefs has now been enlarged and the eight principal chiefs have been given the chairmanships of the new local councils.

Economic Crisis Worsens

The most immediate economic—and ultimately, political—problem confront-



ing the government is the progressive worsening of drought conditions since 1960. The drought, the worst in this generation, had by April 1966 caused the loss of some 400,000 head of cattle out of the total national herd of 1,300,000; meanwhile, lack of rain had turned much of the country's available land into a gigantic dust bowl. By July 1966, 110,000 people, one fifth of the total population, were being fed by the government.

Although the FAO World Food Program (and the United States, which has granted over \$3,000,000 worth of food to Bechuanaland through the WFP since mid-1965) has held off widescale famine to date, officials estimate that over half of the population will require emergency feeding if the rains fail again in late 1966. The UK committee of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign announced in July 1966 a gift of \$856,960 to improve the country's agricultural potential. In April, the UN World Food Program responded to a Bechuanaland request for \$13,000,000 for famine relief. A considerable portion of the \$10,556,000 provided in 1965 by the British Government in

direct grant-in-aid and Colonial Development and Welfare funds has to be expended on drought relief. (Significantly, while Bechuanaland's position is more critical than that of Basutoland, no request has been addressed to the South African Government for assistance, even though Pretoria has all but directly solicited such a request.)

A mission appointed in 1959 by the High Commissioner, in consultation with the World Bank, to study the development priorities of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, concluded that expansion of the livestock industry (through better pasture management, disease control, improved breeding, and the creation of less exhausting routes to market) is the key to any improvement in Bechuanaland's general economic position. The mission, headed by Professor Chandler Morse of Cornell University, also called for improved communications and the development of water resources through better conservation of existing supplies and a serious search for new surface and underground sources. All this requires capital of dimensions that

neither Botswana itself nor its British mentors can be expected to supply.

Relations with South Africa

In these circumstances, Bechuanaland's foreign policy has necessarily been put together with painstaking attention to nuance and detail. When he was invited by the Queen's Commissioner, Sir Peter Fawcus, to form a government in 1965, Seretse Khama reaffirmed his intention—already clearly enunciated during the campaign—to welcome investment from all countries, including South Africa and Rhodesia. Given its geographical location in the heart of Southern Africa, Khama said, Bechuanaland would have to make some pragmatic decisions in the realm of economic policy that might distress African states not fully conversant with the scope of his dilemma. But there would be no compromise on basic political points: Independent Botswana would seek membership in the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations, and would

assure temporary asylum (though not a base for subversive operations) for political refugees from South Africa.

For the whites of Bechuanaland and for the governing Nationalist Party of South Africa, Seretse Khama's victory was the least of three evils. As if in preparation for a Khama victory, the Nationalist press had ceased to express interest in his British-born wife by 1963, and hope was expressed that Bechuanaland's early independence might lead the country into a new economic association of Southern African states. Indeed, Dr. Verwoerd even sent his personal congratulations to Seretse Khama shortly after the 1965 election results were announced, and the Minister of Interior meanwhile casually announced that the ban on Khama's entering the Republic had been lifted on October 21, 1964.

Responding politely to these overtures, Khama nonetheless began long before independence to define some of the bounds to the relationship with his powerful neighbor. Whereas Dr. Verwoerd

used the term "friendship," Khama spoke of "neutrality." He did not reject the idea of diplomatic ties, but also gave no indication that they could be established on any basis except the same full equality accorded white diplomatic missions in South Africa. More pointedly, one of Khama's first moves as Prime Minister was to pay an official visit to Zambia, where he spent five days exploring the possibilities of closer economic ties between the two countries with the explicit objective of ensuring that Bechuanaland would "not be dependent on one nation."

The invitation extended to Khama by President Nkrumah to attend the October 1965 OAU conference in Accra as his "special guest" brought Bechuanaland to one of many difficult crossroads that doubtless lie ahead. Substituting for the Prime Minister, Vice-President Masire told the assembled heads of state that economic dependence on South Africa was a fact over which his government had no control, but emphasized that this did not reduce its abhorrence of apartheid. Although Masire was politely received, the OAU dealt him a stunning blow by going on record in support of the defeated opposition parties in each of the former High Commission Territories. The representatives of the Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland governments attending as observers decided to ignore this attack and instead expressed appreciation for a resolution ensuring and guaranteeing the independence of the territories after independence.

While the governing parties of the three Protectorates were all equally affronted by the Accra resolution, Seretse Khama did not warm to a subsequent proposal by the Basutoland National Party and the Swazi Imbokodvo to form a joint committee to deal with this and other shared problems. On hearing reports that the Imbokodvo might now be willing to accept a less than normal diplomatic relationship with South Africa, Khama quietly reaffirmed his government's African character by commenting that it was difficult to see how Botswana and South Africa could exchange diplomatic representatives when Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's offer had already been refused by Pretoria.

The unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith government in Rhodesia in late 1965 created new problems. Britain's decision to counteract the banning in Rhodesia of BBC broadcasts by constructing a radio transmitter in the Bechuana town of Francistown (only 15 miles from the Rhodesian border) and to embargo the shipment of oil to Rhodesia, pulled Bechuanaland into the very center of the fray. Although Khama has firmly denied reports that he was pressured into acquiescence on the construc-

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

(RAND 1.00 = \$1.40)

Imports	1964 Value (Estimated)	1964 Quantity
Sorghum, millet, maize, wheat	R 1,776,000	32,798 tons
Other foodstuffs	937,000	
Cattle	112,000	1,618 head
Other livestock	6,000	
Vehicles and machinery	1,440,000	
General merchandise	2,727,000	
Building materials	400,000	
Textiles	895,000	
Petroleum	1,036,000	
Estimated Imports	R 9,329,000	
Exports	1965 Value	1965 Quantity
Cattle (live)	R 838,000	19,468 head
(carcasses)	5,802,000	135,578
Other animals	54,000	
Hides and skins (domestic animals)	658,000	
Skins, Trophies, etc. of wild animals	139,000	
Canned meat and extract	1,185,000	1,330 tons
Other animal products	1,003,000	
Asbestos	185,300	1,369 tons
Manganese	32,000	4,574 tons
Gold	700	
Cotton	221,000	1,312 tons
Other agricultural produce	56,000	
Labor (deferred pay and remittances)	1,146,000	32,319 persons worked in South Africa
Total Exports	R11,320,000	

From the May 1966 issue of *Kutlwano*, a publication of the Information Branch of the Bechuanaland Government.

tion of the radio station, he has voiced fears that if force were used to settle the UDI question, it could not be confined to Rhodesia. In view of the vociferous white minority in the Francistown area, whose sympathy for Rhodesia and South Africa is undisguised, there can be no doubt that any British military activity based in Bechuanaland would strain the *modus vivendi* over which Khama presides. Indeed, Britain was so concerned about local white reaction that a special military detachment was sent in to guard the Francistown station against sabotage.


However reluctantly he faced this crisis, Khama's eventual policy position was clear-cut: his government could not and would not recognize "the illegal Smith regime" and the banning of all shipments of arms, ammunition and oil through Bechuanaland would be fully supported.

A Wider Range of Options?

Strengthened by the belief that his options in foreign affairs are somewhat broader than those of Basutoland and Swaziland—Botswana is the only one of the three territories with a common border with an independent African state—Khama has opened up a variety of external contacts.

The references to Zambia noted earlier reflect a consistent line in Botswana foreign policy statements. While staying as a guest at the Zambian Embassy in Washington in late 1965, for example, Khama observed that Bechuanaland and Zambia "understood each other more than a good many countries elsewhere because they are situated in a part of Africa which has various racial conflicts." In addition, the Botswana President has invited the US Peace Corps to assist in staffing his schools and is lobbying for American economic assistance, has asked the UN Development Program for \$1,960,000 for a comprehensive hydrological survey, is launching educational, civil service, and agricultural training programs in cooperation with a variety of British agencies, Sweden, Nationalist China, West Germany, and the United States, made an official visit to Israel in April 1966, and is bargaining for all the help he can get from the UK Government. Meanwhile, South Africa graciously accepted an invitation to attend Botswana's independence celebrations, and sent Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller as its official representative.

In short, the Khama government's foreign policy—and perhaps its survival—is keyed to a delicate balancing act aimed at involving a widening range of friends in economic assistance programs, making no enemies, and retaining reasonable freedom of movement within certain obvious bounds.



President Seretse Khama

A POLICY OF PRUDENCE

SERETSE KHAMA

(Based on an address delivered at Fordham University, New York, October 1965.)

BECHUANALAND has not figured greatly in the newspapers of the world because we have worked for independence peacefully and responsibly. Even so, I believe that the problems that face us at independence are greater than have faced most other colonial territories at a similar stage; however successfully we may have utilized our national resources, we will fall short of what we require for an independent nation in many respects.

For the sake of simplicity, it is possible to describe our problems as falling into three main categories. The first of these arises out of our geographical position: we are virtually surrounded by countries which have quite different policies from our own. The second, and probably most fundamental, is that Bechuanaland is one of the poorest countries in a relatively poor continent. Thirdly, arising out of the first two, we lack adequate numbers of educated Batswana to administer and develop our country.

My ideal is to establish in Bechuanaland a democratic state which must also be completely non-racial and unified. I cannot contemplate a future for Bechuanaland with separate representations for different racial groups, because the rights and interests of all sections of the com-

munity cannot be fully provided for in a system with second class citizenship and imbalanced representation. Nor by such a system could we create a unified nation in Bechuanaland. Many do say and will say that ours is an experiment that is bound to fail. Many base such a view on pure racial prejudice. Some base it on mere practical considerations, arguing that one cannot justifiably expose the wealth and high standard of living of the more developed white section of the community to the whims and prejudices of the untutored African majority of the people. They say that it is wrong to expose those minority sections who are at present best able to produce the wealth, technical knowledge, and general ability, to the political caprices of African majorities.

These are the arguments that our neighbors in South Africa use to support their divergent policies from our own. We stand virtually alone in Southern Africa in our belief that a non-racial society can work now, and there are those among our neighbors who would be only too delighted to see our experiment fail.

WE HAVE, I believe, made some real progress in creating a non-racial and harmonious society in Bechuanaland during the last few years. It is a source of pleasure to me that in our March 1965 general elections, Europeans in

Bechuanaland were prepared to and did vote in constituencies where all the candidates were Africans. Conversely, in one constituency where 95 percent of the electorate were Africans, it was a European who took 85 percent of the poll even though his two opponents were Africans. These are healthy signs that our people are tolerant and sensible enough to discount the accident of a man's color and concentrate on his ability and usefulness to his country. Further, all our schools are now integrated. Those who scoffed a few years ago at the suggestion that we would be able to maintain standards of education and removed their children, have now in many cases accepted integration and have returned their children to the non-racial schools.

I would not like to suggest that integration in Bechuanaland has been a simple, or even fully successful, operation; but I believe we have shown that people of different races and of different backgrounds, who only a few years ago lived in completely separate societies, have found that when they make the effort to come together and are prepared to exercise tolerance for each other's way of life, they can gain greatly from mutual experience and society. We have still a long way to go before we can say that our non-racial society has succeeded and is completely accepted, but our experiment must succeed in Bechuanaland or our neighbors will have a sound case for showing that apartheid is the answer.

THE advocates of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa enjoy making political capital of the fact that the African in the Republic enjoys a higher standard of living than his brother in Bechuanaland. And at present, this point is a difficult one to answer. Bechuanaland is not going to survive on the strength of a moral sense of superiority, but must also have an economically prosperous people. Freedom is all very well, but it will not fill the stomachs of the Batswana. It may surprise you to know that my country, which is roughly the size of Texas and has a population of over half a million, until quite recently existed on an annual budget of about \$1,000,000.

Only during the last 10 years have we been able to raise money for development, and it is hardly surprising that we have been unable to effect all the development schemes we require. Bechuanaland needs development capital to institute essential schemes in our cattle industry, in agriculture, in water development, and in education and social services. For these schemes, we require very substantial sums of money in the form of limited free grants and soft loans. In the past, as a British Protectorate, we

were dependent on Britain for all our development funds, but it has been made quite apparent to me that we cannot expect the British Government to finance all our requirements. Independence comes at a time when the British economy is experiencing considerable difficulties, and it seems most unlikely that our grant-in-aid will be increased, as we require, in the future.

The problem is therefore quite simply a question of where we turn for these funds. It is distressing, but understandable, to note that many countries only get assistance if they become an international problem, if they become a pawn in the differences between East and West. It is not my ambition to sit on the fence between East and West and to place Bechuanaland at the disposal of the highest bidder. But as a politician who believes that the economic development of his country and the prosperity of his people are among the most important goals he must pursue, it is my duty to seek and find the assistance that my country requires. I would prefer to approach those nations whose policies and ideals are the same as my own.

The harsh reality of politics must be faced, however. If I cannot meet the needs of my people, they will turn to my political opponents, who already operate with funds supplied by Communist countries and who have promises of further assistance should they come to power in Bechuanaland. At present, I believe that I do represent the interests and loyalties of the vast majority of Batswana, as demonstrated by the fact that my party was returned with the support of over 80 percent of the poll in the 1965 general election, and holds 28 of the 31 elected seats in our Legislative Assembly. But when one considers that the first year of my government was marked by the most disastrous famine the country has experienced for 35 years, and that 20 percent of the people are classified as destitute, it is evident that our introduction to politics has not been an easy one.

IN A COUNTRY as backward as my own and which has so many needs, it is difficult to give absolute priority to any particular form of development. But certainly one of our greatest needs is to develop our educational system so that we may train Batswana for the country's administration. At present, almost 50 percent of our population has received no education whatsoever; of children who are now between the age of five and 20, only one third attend school. This is not because of any reluctance to attend school, but because the schools are full and in many cases overcrowded. Of our teachers, less than 50 percent are quali-

fied. In one of our primary schools in 1962, a teacher with only three years schooling himself was found to be teaching a class in the fifth year of the primary course. Throughout the country, we have only six secondary schools with a total enrollment of 1,036 pupils. We require at least another 400 qualified teachers and 1,000 new classrooms to meet our current needs, but we are only producing 216 passes a year with the minimum qualification of a Secondary School Certificate. There is an equally pressing need for us to expand our post-secondary vocational and university training. At present there are only 67 Batswana training in universities and colleges abroad.

In spite of our shortage of funds, we have, perhaps optimistically, prepared plans involving a capital expenditure of some \$5,000,000 to improve our existing secondary schools and to build another for teacher training, to build an Agricultural Training School, and to develop our only vocational training college. These are schemes that we do not have sufficient funds to implement, but if the shortfall should become available, we should be able during the next 10 years to train sufficient Batswana for most of the posts we require, below the specialist level.

I would not like to give the impression, however, that the people of Bechuanaland are merely waiting for the rest of the world to come to their assistance. We do have a thriving Community Development Department which is directing self-help programs. In a country where the per capita income is as low as \$40 per annum, we have built many classrooms with voluntary labor. My own tribe during the last few years has built no less than 40 classrooms by its own efforts, and there is a voluntary educational levy in some areas. Batswana are pathetically eager to have education: in 1964, we had only 300 secondary school places for 1,700 applicants with the requisite qualifications.

If we do not succeed in educating our own people, we will either have to allow expatriates to continue to fill important posts in the administration and cause bitter discontent among our own people or else—by placing untrained Batswana in posts they are unqualified to hold—allow the standards of administration to fall and the economic development of the country to stagnate. If this is the choice, my vision of a harmonious and prosperous non-racial state will never materialize, and the critics of our policies will be justified. I have faith, however, that others will find that my hopes are worthy of support, and that in the course of time we will create in Bechuanaland the society we want.